US Quantum Tech Export Controls Would Be 'Premature,' Expert Says
Placing export controls now on quantum information science technologies likely would “cause more harm than good,” Sam Howell, a research assistant with the Center for a New American Security, said in a May 1 article for the Lawfare blog. Although the U.S. could take several paths in imposing quantum technology restrictions -- including specific end-user controls or broader restrictions targeting “entire integrated quantum systems” -- she said each carries “significant pitfalls and are unlikely to be effective in protecting the U.S.’s strategic edge at this stage of development.”
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“Premature export controls could impede innovation and handicap U.S. companies,” Howell wrote. “Export controls on quantum technologies may be necessary in the future but should serve as one component of a broader U.S. technology strategy, rather than an end in and of themselves.”
The Bureau of Industry and Security has said it’s considering new restrictions on quantum technologies (see 2210270047 and 2212140044), but tech industry officials say it’s still too early to regulate the technology, which could risk damaging American competitiveness (see 2206220022).
Howell argued the trajectory of quantum technology is “highly uncertain, and premature restriction carries more risk than reward,” even while acknowledging “valid concerns about China’s activity in the quantum sector.” She noted that much of the top talent within the quantum technology field is located outside the U.S., and export controls could limit the exchange of ideas, restrict American scientists from “accessing promising research and early-stage prototypes, and stifle the scientific advancement of quantum technology before it demonstrates any significant commercial benefit.”
“Ill-timed export controls could stymie progress on a range of beneficial quantum computing applications,” Howell wrote, “from drug design and discovery to financial fraud detection and port logistics optimization.”
She also pointed out China and the U.S. “are each other’s top collaborators on quantum research,” and China leads the U.S. in quantum communications. “Continued collaboration presents serious technology leakage, industrial espionage, and intellectual property risks that must be actively policed,” Howell wrote. “But reducing cooperation now risks impeding U.S. innovation and losing visibility into China’s research efforts.”
Outbound investment restrictions, as opposed to export controls, may be better suited to target quantum technologies, she wrote, noting that even though almost all of China’s quantum research and development is state-controlled, the country’s private sector “appears to attract some U.S. investment.” The Biden administration has reportedly considered capturing quantum-related transactions as part of a potential outbound investment screening regime (see 2304200058, 2302280011 and 2301120035).
“Screening tools, including the establishment of a mandatory notification regime for American investments in China’s quantum technology sector, could offer policymakers a means to track the exchange of technology and expertise and monitor China’s progress in the field,” Howell wrote.
She also pointed to several steps the administration should take before imposing any potential quantum export controls, including by “clearly” defining “its goals in quantum information science” and directing an organization to “conduct quantum supply chain mapping on a continuous basis and resource it appropriately.” It also should “consider what level of supply chain dependence on allies and partners is acceptable” and should "resource" the intelligence community and the Commerce Department to make sure it has “timely and accurate information about adversaries’ capabilities and intentions in order to determine when export controls on quantum technologies become necessary.”