Don't Impose Export Controls on Quantum Tech, Research Group Says
U.S. export controls on quantum computing and communication technologies would slow scientific progress and fail to target the most “defense-relevant applications,” the nonprofit Rand Corp. said in a recent report. The think tank said the U.S. should “not impose export controls on quantum computers or quantum communications systems at this time” or risk stifling American quantum innovation.
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The recommendation comes amid the Bureau of Industry and Security’s emerging technology control effort, which could place restrictions on certain slices of quantum technologies, a technology category initially listed by BIS in 2018 as a candidate for export restrictions. Rand, whose research report was sponsored by the Department of Defense, said quantum technologies are “still at a low enough level of readiness that open scientific research is still a major driver of technology advancement” and many of the field’s top researchers are outside the U.S. “QIS [quantum information science] research is highly international,” Rand said, “and export controls would impede this collaboration.”
A BIS spokesperson said the agency "takes the issue of quantum computing and communications technologies seriously." BIS "constantly reviews and considers a wide range of open source and other materials as it considers the appropriate" export controls under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, the spokesperson said Feb. 18.
The group also said no current quantum technologies have “demonstrated” defense uses and it’s not yet possible to “predict which technology approaches will eventually yield any.” But the group added that a “broad base” of experts, including those located outside the U.S., “experimenting with early-stage prototypes” could speed up discoveries of defense uses for quantum technology. If BIS were to control quantum technologies, it would likely aim for a dual-use aspect of the technology that can be used by foreign militaries.
“Given the current uncertainty in eventual applications, we believe that at this stage, it would be impossible to craft export controls that apply to only the specific quantum computing and communications technologies that threaten U.S. national security,” Rand said. It suggested the government instead ask manufacturers to “privately report” data on their exports of quantum equipment to help the government “monitor their deployment.” After the technology “advances closer to useful applications such as code-breaking,” the Commerce and State departments should “reassess the need for export controls.”
Before then, the U.S. should also monitor international flows of “key elements” of the quantum technology industrial base -- including critical components, materials and final products -- to identify key suppliers or supply chain intermediaries, Rand said. Although it said it hasn’t identified “any critical supply-chain dependencies on strategic competitor nations,” that could change.
The U.S. should also monitor China’s efforts in this space, particularly involving research collaboration with Chinese entities that could lead to illegal technology transfers. But U.S.-China collaboration is “to be expected,” Rand said, adding that the U.S. shouldn’t impose restrictions on this collaboration. “However,” Rand said, “the risk of scientific and technological leakage should be monitored.”