House Communications Members Seek to Advance Spectrum, Supply-Chain Security Bills

“Now that we've had the hearing, we'll start to decide” over the two-week recess “what we're going to do,” House Communications Chairman Mike Doyle, D-Pa., told reporters afterward. “A lot of these bills are pretty much going to have bipartisan support, and we obviously want to help the small rural carriers” that incorporated equipment into their networks from companies that may be a security risk, including Huawei and ZTE. HR-4459 would require the FCC to provide $1 billion in funding to aid in removing gear (see 1909240065).

“At some point, we'll probably do a markup that's going to take a lot of bills into consideration and try to clear the deck” of pending measures, Doyle said. There's no decision on whether the subcommittee will choose to combine several of the supply chain or spectrum bills together as it's currently working to do with broadband mapping legislation (see 1909110071). Doyle hopes a markup could happen as soon as next month (see 1909250063).

House Commerce Committee Chairman Frank Pallone, D-N.J., and ranking member Greg Walden, R-Ore., during the hearing noted their concerns about the threat of China and other potential bad actors, as they touted their sponsorship of HR-4459. “Much of the global supply chain for telecommunications equipment flows through China at one point,” Pallone said. "Chinese industrial policies allow state-run manufacturers like Huawei to sell suspect equipment to American providers cheaper than nearly anyone else. Although many of the bigger carriers have avoided these threats, it still is a significant issue for smaller and more rural carriers who built their networks using suspect equipment.”

Many small broadband “providers don’t have an army of consultants with the necessary security clearances to understand what vulnerabilities exist and how to inform their purchasing decisions,” Walden said. For those getting federal support to build out broadband networks in unserved areas, "we cannot set them up for failure by requiring them to select the lowest cost equipment option, only then for Uncle Sam to later say, 'Well, not that lowest cost equipment.'”

Walden later questioned HR-4459's proposed one-year timeline for carriers to remove affected hardware. Pine Belt Communications President John Nettles said it's “going to be a challenge” to remove the gear within that period, especially if large portions of a network are affected. Much also depends on whether there will be sufficient replacement equipment and workers to install it, he said.

House Communications ranking member Bob Latta, R-Ohio, and others including Adam Kinzinger, R-Ill., Darren Soto, D-Fla., and Marc Veasey, D-Texas, also dug into the security issues HR-4459 aims to address. Latta raised concerns about how discarded equipment would be handled, including whether any should be “resold on the secondary market.” Kinzinger said that “no foreign actor should have the ability to eavesdrop” via backdoors in telecom equipment.

Veasey wondered if there are U.S. producers of 5G equipment to “pick up the slack” if manufacturers like Huawei and ZTE are excluded. Soto focused on longstanding congressional interest in their security threat, partly citing a 2012 House Intelligence Committee report against U.S. use of either company's products (see 1210100053).

Sen. Marsha Blackburn, R-Tenn., said on C-SPAN she wants to "rip and replace" suspect telecom equipment (see 1909270020). FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel said during a Friday National Institute of Standards and Technology event she's worried about problematic gear and wants a more-comprehensive cybersecurity hygiene approach (see 1909270056).

Spectrum Sharing

Pallone and Walden also noted the importance of HR-4462, to direct the FCC and NTIA to develop a R&D program to find new ways to share frequencies between federal incumbents and commercial users. The bill “does a great deal to help NTIA meet the mission-critical needs of government agencies in a more efficient and modern way,” Pallone said. “The FCC, likewise, must remain in the driver’s seat when it comes to commercial spectrum.”

Walden cited the “bit of a struggle” he and Pallone have had in opposing efforts to give DOD a larger spectrum management role. They've raised concerns (see 1909180048) about language in the Senate-passed FY 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (S-1790) that tells DOD to work with the FCC and NTIA to establish a spectrum sharing R&D program aimed at sharing between 5G technologies, federal and nonfederal incumbent systems. Seven senators are attempting to remove the Senate-passed language via a House-Senate conference committee's work to reconcile S-1790 and the House-passed NDAA (HR-2500), communications sector lobbyists told us. “It's bad policy,” Walden said Friday.

“We need to find ways to modernize how the government uses and shares spectrum amongst agencies and departments," along "with the commercial sector,” Doyle said. He cited the FCC's plan for allocating the 3.5 GHz citizens broadband radio service band as “a great example of how sharing can effectively accommodate a wide range of users and a wide range of uses. My hope is that [HR-4462] can act as a bridge to future innovative sharing scenarios like we see in the CBRS band.”

House Communications Vice Chair Doris Matsui, D-Calif., noted a general need for “smart spectrum policies for both licensed and unlicensed use” for 5G and future wireless technologies. She said she's continuing to collaborate with Doyle to marry elements of Doyle's draft bill to support a public auction of C-band spectrum and her similar Wireless Investment Now in (Win) 5G Act (HR-4171).

Also on the docket were: H.Res. 575, the Eliminate From Regulators Opportunities to Nationalize the Internet in Every Respect (E-Frontier) Act (HR-2063), the Secure 5G and Beyond Act (HR-2881), the Network Security Information Sharing Act (HR-4461) and the Promoting United States Wireless Leadership Act (HR-4500). HR-4500 was filed days earlier as HR-4463. H.Res. 575 would express the sense of the House that 5G development stakeholders should consider adhering to proposals adopted at the May Prague 5G Security Conference on a cooperative approach to security, with each nation free to develop its own policies (see 1905030052).

HR-2063 and Senate version S-918 would bar the White House from proposing the U.S. build a national 5G network without congressional authorization (see 1807230059). HR-2881 and Senate version S-893 would require the president develop a strategy for ensuring security of 5G networks and infrastructure (see 1903270065). HR-4461 would direct the Homeland Security secretary to create a “program to share information regarding supply chain security risks with trusted providers of advanced communications service and trusted suppliers of communications equipment or services.” HR-4500 would direct NTIA to encourage U.S. companies and others to participate in international standards-setting bodies.