Commerce Urges FCC to Pause Orbital Debris Rulemaking, Warning of Overlap, Confusion

In the interim, the FCC should be part of an interagency working group on commercial orbital debris requirements that would identify what agency is best to handle orbital debris regulation, Commerce said. The FCC didn't comment.

Commerce said its Office of Space Commerce is overseeing work on developing policies on orbital debris, and a space situational awareness and space traffic management services request for information is to be released soon that will ask questions about orbital debris mitigation best practices. It said it and the State Department will convene a space enterprise summit in June on trying to advance international space commerce, including "creation of a permissive, 'light tough' regulatory regime." Commerce said FCC actions should be guided in part by interagency efforts involving NASA, DOD, State, Commerce and Transportation and the Director of National Intelligence to update government orbital debris mitigation standard practices. It said FCC action should be guided by FAA orbital debris reforms, with the FAA developing an NPRM on its own current debris rules.

An applicant's orbit choice should come from space traffic management best practices and should be evaluated earlier than the usual licensing effort, NASA said. It suggested post-mission disposal of a satellite should require the satellite remain active and able to maneuver until its apogee is below the International Space Station altitude.

In comments posted Monday and Friday, others debated the FCC's role. It should let other federal agencies be the lead in orbital debris issues, with it "assuming a complementary role," Orbcomm said. It and launch broker Spaceflight urged the agency to synchronize its rules with other agencies and administrations internationally. Boeing said the FCC shouldn't adopt rules on orbital debris without first "careful coordination" with other federal agencies with expertise, including agencies that operate their own satellite systems. Maxar Technologies said the FCC should incorporate other agencies' orbital debris regulatory regimes into its rules. Secure World Foundation said without the FCC driving ahead, private sector operators could lack proper oversight, or space activities never happen because of lack of oversight. The U.S. should look at existing authorities for orbital debris mitigation, done by an agency with space situational awareness responsibility, it said.

Filers said satellites planned for orbits above 400 kilometers should have to include propulsion for deorbit and collision avoidance. Iridium said NGSO applicants should have to quantify in-orbit collision risks and it's "unfounded" for a satellite capable of maneuvering to be treated as presenting no risk. It said operators of satellites above 400 kilometers should be required to notify the FCC of a satellite failure and explain plans for avoiding collision with debris and rationale for that orbit. LeoSat said if the agency requires operators initially deploy at 650 kilometers before moving higher, that should be limited to constellations with more than 150 satellites and only to the first five or 10 percent.

Rather than propulsion, the FCC should require "maneuverability" for collision avoidance and end-of-life deorbiting, Orbcomm said. Boeing also argued against required propulsion capabilities.

There were calls for orbital separations between big NGSO constellations. Letting large NGSO constellations overlap latitudes "is a recipe for orbital catastrophe," said OneWeb. Iridium said only one constellation operating at between 400 and 2,000 kilometers should be allowed to operate at a particular altitude.

Iridium and OneWeb said de-orbit should be required within five years of the end of a satellite's operational life. OneWeb argued against requiring an automatic de-orbit of LEO satellites after a failure as potentially increasing risk. Telesat Canada said operators should strive for that but for now, 25 years suffice. ViaSat backs creating formal license extension procedures with each extension being a maximum of five years. Orbcomm said 25 years might be too long, but it's premature to select a shorter deadline. The Satellite Industry Association and Eutelsat said (see here and here) decisions about GSO satellite licenses term extensions should be made case by case. NASA said the 25-year rule doesn't negatively contribute to the orbital environment significantly.

Boeing said requiring NGSOs automatically start disposal procedures if there's a loss of power or communications isn't likely to be successful, and redundant critical systems would more effectively prevent debris. Echoed LeoSat, automatic de-orbiting would require "an excessive level of decision-making autonomy" in satellite algorithms.

SpaceX said rules should be applied on a per satellite basis. It said the safety profile of a constellation depends on more than altitude.

Commenters urged using NASA standards to quantify the collision risk for a satellite in or passing through low earth orbit. Those should be prorated based on a five-year service life, said Telesat Canada. It and SES/O3b (see here) said collision risk with large objects should be considered zero if the satellite has collision avoidance. OneWeb said NASA standards should be applied on an aggregate, systemwide basis; Boeing said the NASA metric should be adopted on a per satellite basis, and extensions of longer than five years OK. Eutelsat said there's no reason to require the NASA standard be used for calculating risk to GSO satellites. Sirius XM said since satellite digital audio radio service satellites get only eight-year initial licenses, there should be an exception for SDARS allowing first license extensions of up to eight years.

The FCC got some pushback to its proposal to require encryption of telemetry, tracking and command communications. Providence Access said the FCC should require NSA-approved encryption that can be demonstrated to protect system commands and telemetry data. Eutelsat and ViaSat agreed if the FCC is going to impose encryption requirements, they should be limited to command signals. Intelsat argued against some encryption requirements. Boeing said satellite operators can already encrypt if it's warranted. Sirius XM also opposed required encryption.