San Bernardino Attack Shows Importance of NG-911, Simpson Says

The reports by the two working groups weren't immediately released, though both were discussed in depth during the meeting. TFOPA posted presentations from the two working groups on the FCC website.

“Terrorists see our country and communities within our country as part of their target set,” Simpson said. “As happened in San Bernardino, we will face, unfortunately, again, the need to discover and respond to the actions of terrorists.” If not secured, the 911 system itself can be attacked, he said. The attack could be “part of a layered attack,” Simpson said. “It could come through a physical attack to the 911 infrastructure. It could come from a cyberattack from half a world away."

The 911 system is “literally the envy of the world” and the best anywhere, but must change to keep up with technological change, Simpson said. It's not surprising local authorities have fallen behind in moving to NG-911, he said. “Running day-to-day operations in and of itself is an all-consuming challenge, and during the transition to next-generation 911, state and local 911 authorities must continue to support legacy operations while also investing in new technology and workforce training.”

The response to the attack in San Bernardino, like all such attacks, started with a call to 911, said TFOPA Chairman Steve Souder, director of the Department of Public Safety Communications in Fairfax County, Virginia. “It points out, yet again, how critically important what we are doing here on this task force is to our nation as a whole, and to those absolute first responders that answer those 911 calls.”

The report on PSAP architecture found more than 5,900 PSAPs nationally and that more than 240 million emergency calls are made annually to 911 in the U.S. The report discusses potential architectural models for transitioning 911 systems and basic operational and architectural options, plus technical components, requirements, challenges and opportunities presented by the deployment of NG-911 systems, TFOPA officials said. The report looks at governance but stops short of recommending more PSAP consolidation, as had been urged by FCC Commissioner Mike O’Rielly in January (see 1501260063), officials said. It does encourage more partnerships between PSAPs.

David Holl, chairman of the architecture working group, said the report notes PSAPs have historically operated independently of each other and points to the need for change. Holl, a state 911 official from Pennsylvania, represented the National Association of State 911 Administrators on the task force. “Legacy 911 is inadequate to meet many of the consumer communications expectations that we have,” Holl said. “All of these changes in the next-gen world will have to take place.”

PSAPs need to look at alternate call routing and improved call transfer capabilities, and how to develop the capability to receive multimedia messages, Holl said. The length of the transition “will depend on the individual 911 authorities and their plan and their movement forward in that transition,” he said.

Holl said much work remains and he encouraged the FCC to continue to push the envelope. The report isn't intended to be “exhaustive,” he said. More work remains on the costs and the lessons from early adopters of NG-911, he said. Questions also remain about access to 911 by people with speech and hearing disabilities, he said. “Transitioning from the current legacy environment into the next-gen environment will have a whole myriad of technical operational political choices that governments [and] public safety communities at all levels will have to be involved in.” Holl said one size won’t fit all PSAPs.

The cybersecurity report looks at the state of play today, existing best practices and architectural options, said Jay English, chairman of the working group and APCO director-Comm Center & 911 services. “The threat to PSAPs, emergency communication centers and public safety is undeniably real,” he said. “Cybersecurity exists because cyberattacks exist.” Attacks occur almost daily and will only increase as PSAPs go to IP networks, he said. The costs of defense are also high, English said. A small cybersecurity center, that could potentially be shared by numerous PSAPs, costs about $900,000 a year to operate, the group found, he said.

There isn't a “thorough and in-depth understanding of cybersecurity practice or the frameworks and that is simply because PSAPs are busy doing what they do each day,” English said. But PSAPs have to adjust as they move their communications to the Internet, he said. Before the report, no one had really looked at what PSAPs are doing and how it differs from corporations, he said.

Most 911 center directors don’t know what their cybersecurity plan is or “they say we do the best we can or we have no Internet access,” English said. More than 70 percent of PSAPs are very small, he noted, with three or fewer employees. “The Department of Defense employs thousands of people and millions of dollars on cybersecurity,” he said. “It is still not enough,” he said. “PSAPs do not have that type of personnel or financial acumen and we're not going to.”

TFOPA is to consolidate the three working group reports into a single report, due at the FCC Jan. 29.