Parties Concerned About Interference When Broadband Really Takes Flight

Concerns arise mainly on interference with primary FSS networks, already grandfathered into the Ku-band. The FCC sought comment in a Feb. NPRM on (1) spectrum allocation and co-frequency service protection, (2) technical and operational requirements, (3) aircraft earth station (AES) licensing considerations, (4) tracking and data retention requirements, and (4) AES regulation based on country of aircraft registry.

The current AMSS licensees, Boeing and ARINC, filed separately last week, touting the Commission’s efforts to develop a comprehensive AMSS regulatory framework. Said Boeing: “Adopting a revised AMSS regulatory regime is the first step in facilitating the expansion of innovative broadband services to the flying public.” But the licensees called into question some Commission proposals and parted ways with each other on several points.

The parties mainly disagreed on the Commission’s proposal that the location of aircraft earth stations (AESs) be tracked for interference purposes. Boeing said AMSS operators should provide the Commission AES location information given certain precautions, but ARINC said aircraft location tracking shouldn’t fly under any circumstances.

Boeing said real-time aircraft location information is sensitive and should be made available only in the context of interference resolution. But the company said it supported the requirement that AMSS licensees retain tracking information 90 days. Tracking data maintained by a 3rd party or in real-time would be “unnecessary and potentially raises security concerns,” but the “general proposition that Ku-band AMSS operators should be able to provide identification and location information… will aid the Commission in enforcing its rules,” said Boeing.

ARINC, whose AMSS market is private business jets, said all the Commission’s tracking proposals should be rejected, contending tracking aircraft information, location or both would threaten the existence of AMSS service throughout the business jet market. Location tracking data isn’t needed to remedy interference infractions, ARINC argued, as long as the system licensee has the necessary data and is responsible for eliminating interference.

“Corporate users and individuals who own, lease, or otherwise fly on business jets are particularly sensitive, as are most persons in a free society, about their location being tracked,” ARINC said. Electronic information is never completely secure, even when the data are available only to govt. agencies whose top concern is security, argued ARINC. ARINC said AES tracking data could divulge travel patterns that might be used to determine or predict the location of an aircraft and its passengers, raising safety and industrial espionage concerns.

At a minimum, ARINC said the FCC should make AES tracking data exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. AMSS operators shouldn’t be obligated to disclose data that would identify the particular aircraft and/or its owner or passengers for any reason.

But FSS companies backed the Commission’s tracking proposals. Intelsat was on the fence, saying that as long as the information is maintained by the Commission, there’s “no need to make it publicly available.” But PanAmSat drew a hard line. “The most difficult sources of interference to track are those, such as AES terminals, that are mobile and transmit intermittently,” said PanAmSat: “Giving FSS operators access to precise aircraft location and frequency information will facilitate interference resolution, and will obviate the need, when interference occurs, for the FSS operator to search for an AES needle in the haystack of space.”

PanAmSat suggested “passive tracking” so as to include all installed AES terminals, in use or not. If an AES terminal got “lost” when not in use - by being sold to another carrier that didn’t subscribe to AMSS) -- active tracking might not account for the terminal properly if it malfunctioned or unexpectedly resumed transmission, said PanAmSat.

As far as foreign-licensing issues are concerned, the Commission’s proposed licensing structure is too complex, said ARINC. The Commission suggested all aircraft stations be U.S. licensed -- even non-U.S. registered aircraft using U.S.-operated AMSS systems, and non-U.S.- registered aircraft using foreign-based and foreign- licensed AMSS systems. ARINC called the U.S. licensing unnecessary, saying the Commission should simply codify the Convention on International Civil Aviation instead. The Convention requires aircraft stations be licensed by the country in which the aircraft is registered, but are then subject to regulations of the country overflown.

Boeing agreed the proposal “does not appear to have Commission precedent or ITU requirements.” Boeing said adopting different requirements for U.S. and foreign AMSS systems would be contrary to the Commissions’s goals of promoting development of AMSS and minimizing regulatory burdens. Boeing proposed that AESs on foreign-licensed aircraft “be temporarily associated with and licensed to the U.S. AMSS licensee (or service vendor authorized by the operator) when the AES is operating within U.S. airspace.” For the interim, the U.S.-licensed AMSS operator would assume the same license responsibility for the AES as if the AES were regularly licensed to it, said Boeing.